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Mistakes, Changed Circumstances and Intent
Nancy Kim*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Suppose a purchaser wishes to buy a vacation home using the
Internet. She desires a house in the country where she can escape the
sounds and stresses of the city. On the basis of pictures posted on a
website, she enters into an agreement to purchase a house that looks like
an idyllic country home. During inspection, she discovers a noisy,
nearby road. The house looks exactly as it does on the website, but the
posted pictures failed to capture the surrounding environment. The
purchaser imagined her mornings would be filled with the sounds of
chirping birds, not blaring car horns. The noise from the road would not
be unbearable to the average homebuyer, but it undermines the
purchaser’s reason for buying the house. Could our purchaser avoid the
transaction? Should she be allowed to?
Contract law requires that in order for promises to be legally
enforceable, they must be supported by consideration.1 A corollary,
often referred to as the “bargain principle,” provides that bargains will be

*
Associate Professor, California Western School of Law. B.A. 1987, University of
California, Berkeley; J.D. 1990, Boalt Hall; LL.M. 1993, University of California, Los Angeles. I
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Cal., March 31–April 2, 2006, the Conference of Asian Pacific American Law Professors, Wayne
State University School of Law, Detroit, Mich., April 7–8, 2006 and the Annual Meeting of the Law
and Society Association, Baltimore, Md., July 6–9, 2006. Special thanks to Tom Barton, Richard
Carlson, Mike Dessent, and Neil Gotanda for their careful review of prior drafts and their helpful
insights and suggestions, and to Helene Colin for her thorough research assistance. Thanks also to
the editors of the Kansas Law Review, in particular Adam Gasper and Samia Khan, for their
diligence and hard work. All errors are mine alone.
1. See LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 8 (7th ed. 2001).
While few scholars question that bargains supported by consideration are enforceable (absent
available contract defenses, of course), many scholars dispute whether consideration is still a
relevant or necessary requirement for enforcement of a promise. See id. at 8–9. In other words,
while the existence of consideration may establish an enforceable promise, the absence of
consideration should not necessarily preclude enforcement. For a discussion of the relevance of the
“gatekeeping” function of consideration, see Mark B. Wessman, Should We Fire the Gatekeeper?
An Examination of the Doctrine of Consideration, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 45 (1993).
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enforced according to their terms.2 Stated another way, as long as there
is a bargained-for exchange of a legal detriment (or conferral of a legal
benefit), courts should not consider the adequacy of consideration. There
are, however, situations where the parties have entered into a bargain and
then sought either to avoid enforcement or to reform the contract terms.
A party seeking avoidance or reformation must prove one or more of
several established “defenses” to enforcement.3 The most common
contract defenses are duress, unconscionability, incapacity, fraud, and the
“basic assumption” defenses4 of mutual mistake, unilateral mistake,
impossibility, frustration of purpose and commercial impracticability.5
In this Article, I limit my discussion to basic assumption defenses.
Several prevailing rationales explain why a party should be allowed to
escape contractual liability despite the sufficiency of consideration where
there has been a failure of a basic assumption material to the transaction.
No single rationale or principle, however, unifies all basic assumption
defenses. Several commentators have noted that similar fact patterns
applying a given doctrine often yield inconsistent results.6 Parties’
employment of these defenses, and courts’ analyses of them, is often
confusing and inaccurate.7
2. See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 741 (1982). Eisenberg argues that in certain cases, such as those involving exploitation or
unfair persuasion, limits on the bargain principle are justified. Id. at 748–86.
3. In this Article, I use the term “contract defenses” to refer to the ways that a party to an
agreement can avoid its obligations despite the existence of mutual assent and valid consideration.
Contract defenses are thus used to demonstrate that a particular bargain was a voidable contract. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 (1981) (“A voidable contract is one where one or more
parties have the power, by a manifestation of election to do so, to avoid the legal relations created by
the contract, or by ratification of the contract to extinguish the power of avoidance.”).
4. Basic assumption defenses are discussed in greater detail in Part III.
5. Nondisclosure is an issue that is relevant to certain defenses, such as mistake and fraud, but
this Article does not treat it as a stand-alone defense.
6. See, e.g., James Gordley, Impossibility and Changed and Unforeseen Circumstances, 52
AM. J. COMP. L. 513, 513–14 (2004) (“[T]he attempt to explain which contracts should be enforced
in terms of whether their performance is possible or not has been a failure.”); Andrew Kull, Mistake,
Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of Contract Remedies, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 3 (1991)
(observing that “judges and writers continue to defer to a supposed distinction between the doctrines
[of mistake and frustration]” but that such a distinction is without a difference).
7. See discussion infra Part III. The variety of ways in which leading contract scholars have
categorized contract defenses underscores the need for a unified framework. For example, Calamari
and Perillo discuss infancy and mental infirmity in a chapter titled “Capacity of Parties,” and duress,
undue influence, misrepresentation, mistake and unconscionability in a chapter titled “Avoidance or
Reformation for Misconduct or Mistake.” JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON
CONTRACTS vii (5th ed. 2003). Farnsworth discusses some defenses (such as infancy, insanity,
duress, and unconscionability) in a chapter titled “Policing the Agreement,” while the defenses of
mistake, impracticability and frustration of purpose are discussed in the chapter “Failure of a Basic
Assumption: Mistake, Impracticability, and Frustration.” E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH
ON CONTRACTS xi–xv, xix (3d ed. 2004). Similarly, contract defenses are variously categorized in
first year contracts casebooks. Fuller and Eisenberg, for example, categorize duress and
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This Article proposes that basic assumption defenses can best be
explained and analyzed through the prism of contractual intent.
Although typically discussed in terms of a singular concept, contractual
intent in fact comprises various facets, which I refer to as volitional
intent, cognitive intent, and contextual purposive intent. Part II provides
an introduction to, and description of, my proposed expanded intent
analysis. Part III applies expanded intent analysis to cases involving
basic assumption defenses. Part IV addresses possible concerns with
using a dynamic approach/expanded intent analysis. This Article
concludes that adopting my proposed intent-based analysis has several
advantages over the current application of contract defenses. First and
foremost, it directly addresses and incorporates contract law’s two
primary objectives: furthering autonomy and facilitating transactions.
Second, because it removes artificial doctrinal distinctions, it eliminates
or minimizes confusion and simplifies analysis. Consequently, it
provides for greater consistency in judicial decisions. Finally, the
approach is flexible, and therefore better accommodates technological
advancements, such as the Internet, in the modern marketplace.
II. THE THREE FACETS OF CONTRACTUAL INTENT
Various rationales justify each basic assumption defense, yet there is
no one consistent organizing principle or framework by which to analyze
all of them.8 Because each defense incorporates both contract-based and
unconscionability in the chapter titled “The Bargain Principle and Its Limits,” while mistakes and
impracticability are discussed in a chapter titled “Mistakes and Changed Circumstances.” FULLER &
EISENBERG, supra note 1, at v–vi. MacNeil and Gudel include misrepresentation, duress, undue
influence, capacity, and unconscionability in a chapter titled “Social Control and Utilization of
Contractual Relations,” but mistakes are included in the chapter “Consequences of Incomplete and
Ineffective Risk Planning.” IAN R. MACNEIL & PAUL J. GUDEL, CONTRACTS EXCHANGE
TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS xxi, xxix (3d ed. 2003) (organizing basic assumption defenses, as
this Article does, by separating those based on unanticipated events that occur before contract
formation from those that occur after contract formation).
Not surprisingly, teaching and learning contract defenses is often challenging. One law
professor describes teaching contract defenses as “one of the more difficult parts of the basic
contracts course” and describes them as “tricky” for students to learn. Miriam Cherry, A
Tyrannosaurus-Rex Aptly Named “Sue”: Using a Disputed Dinosaur to Teach Contract Defenses,
81 N.D. L. REV. 295, 297–99 (2005).
8. See Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in
Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 84 (1977) (noting “an inability to
develop a coherent positive theory consistent with the typical outcomes” in recurring cases dealing
with impossibility, frustration of purpose and impracticability). See also Kull, supra note 6, at 2–3
(noting that “mistake” and “frustration” are “logically and functionally indistinguishable” and
describing them as “two names for the same problem”). Andrew Kull promotes the “windfall
principle” as a unified conceptual model to explain mistake and frustration cases. Under this theory,
“[d]isparities between anticipation and realization . . . the risk of which [have] not been allocated by
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policy-oriented justifications unique to that defense, each defense
typically must be examined on its own terms rather than as part of a
larger theory or principle that unifies all defenses. A dynamic approach
to contract defenses would essentially eliminate the need for the existing
doctrinal categories and, along with it, much of the concomitant
confusion surrounding their application. I propose a dynamic approach
that first examines the intent of the contracting parties, and then weighs
the parties’ intent against society’s interests in the security of
transactions.9 Discussions of free will have tended to overshadow intent
as a subject of scholarly inquiry.10 If contracts are enforceable because
they are the expressions of the free will of the parties, then contracts that
are not freely entered into should not be enforced. While this rationale
may explain the defense of duress, it does not precisely or adequately
capture basic assumption defenses. For example, one entering into a
contract based upon a mistake is not being deprived of free will. The
notion of “free will” or volition is but one aspect of intent. Intent is often
equated with contractual purpose and conscious deliberation. Yet, in
many cases a failure to consider an occurrence (i.e., a lack of conscious
deliberation) undermines contractual purpose.
Intent is not a monolithic or neutral concept. Determinations of
intent hinge upon a party’s credibility.11 Whether a party is found to be
credible often depends upon whether the fact-finder understands or
relates to that party. In some cases, however, the party and the factthe parties, are . . . windfalls . . . .” Id. at 6.
9. As Mel Eisenberg notes:
A modern free enterprise system depends heavily on exchanges over time and on private
planning. The extent to which actors will be ready to engage in such exchanges, and are
able to make reliable plans, depends partly on the probability that promises to render a
bargained-for performance will be kept.
Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 744.
10. As one commentator noted:
[T]here continues to be a significant amount of debate among contract law scholars over
the criteria necessary to determine whether a choice was freely made. While legal
scholars are in agreement that man possesses free will and that free will is necessary to
form an enforceable contract, they do not agree on criteria to determine whether the will
is free in a particular situation.
Philip Bridwell, Comment, The Philosophical Dimension of the Doctrine of Unconscionability, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1517 (2003).
11. According to Randy E. Barnett:
[W]e never have direct access to another individual’s subjective mental state. We thus
must always learn the meaning of terms by comparing (1) the conduct of persons with
their words, or (2) their conduct and words in one context with those in another, or (3)
one person’s conduct and words with another person’s conduct and words. Even in a
subjective theory, evidence of subjective assent must be manifested at some point—if
only from the witness stand or in self-serving documents.
Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 305 (1986).

10 - KIM FINAL II.DOC

2008]

6/13/2008 5:59:08 PM

MISTAKES, CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES AND INTENT

477

finder may not share the same set of social or cultural assumptions or
understandings, and the same act may have different meanings
depending upon the actor. Thus, the likelihood of misunderstandings
arises where cultural dissonance12 exists between the fact-finder and a
party to a contract dispute. Ilhyung Lee, for example, has examined the
differing role of the apology in Korean, Japanese, and American
societies, and emphasized the importance of recognizing such differences
in dispute resolution.13 A recent article in the Harvard Business Review
explained how communication in Western cultures is direct and explicit,
whereas in many other cultures, meaning is embedded in the way the
message is presented.14 The authors of that article noted that the
differences between indirect and direct communication can profoundly
affect cross-cultural business relationships.15 In addition to direct versus
indirect communication, they discussed three other categories of crosscultural tension within multicultural teams: trouble with accents and
fluency, differing attitudes toward hierarchy and authority, and
conflicting norms for decision-making.16 They also observed significant
cultural differences in decision-making, particularly in “how quickly
decisions should be made.”17
The purpose of contract law is often said to be the “realization of
reasonable expectations induced by promises.”18
Reasonable
expectations, however, do not provide the guiding philosophy or
theoretical underpinning for contract law. It explains what contract law
tries to accomplish, but not why.
Two primary philosophical
justifications explain why contract law exists. The first is that private

12. Elsewhere, I have defined “cultural dissonance” as differing socio-cultural and experiential
backgrounds. See Nancy S. Kim, Blameworthiness, Intent and Cultural Dissonance: The Unequal
Treatment of Cultural Defense Defendants, 17 FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199, 202 (2006).
13. Ilhyung Lee, The Law and Culture of the Apology in Korean Dispute Settlement, 27 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 1, 1–7 (2005).
14. See Jeanne Brett, Kristin Behfar & Mary C. Kern, Managing Multicultural Teams, HARV.
BUS. REV., Nov. 2006 at 84.
15. In one situation, an American project manager working with Japanese team members
explained:
In Japan, they want to talk and discuss. Then we take a break and they talk within the
organization. They want to make sure that there’s harmony in the rest of the
organization. One of the hardest lessons for me was when I thought they were saying yes
but they just meant “I’m listening to you.”
Id. at 86.
16. Id. Brett, Behfar and Kern conclude that cultural challenges to management are
manageable provided that management avoids imposing single-culture-based approaches on
multicultural situations. Id.
17. Id. at 88.
18. ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1 (1952).
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agreements should be enforced because contracting promotes individual
autonomy.19 The second predominant justification for contract law is
that it encourages market transactions and is beneficial to a credit
economy.20 Neither justification alone suffices. If the objective of
contract law is simply to promote individual autonomy, then no contract
should be enforced unless there was a subjective intent on the part of
each of the parties to enter into that contract. If, however, the sole
objective of contract law is to encourage promissory exchanges, then the
courts should only permit a party to avoid its contractual obligations
where there was little or no economic or social utility to that contract.
Contract defenses navigate the waters between these two philosophies,
and thus capture the dynamic nature of neoclassical contract law.21
Dynamic or “neoclassical” contract law22 considers not only the
individualistic objectives of contract, but policy issues as well.23
Dynamic contract law24 adopts as its initial point of inquiry the
19. See generally CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION (1981); Barnett, supra note 11.
20. See generally A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (2d
ed. 1989); Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies,
57 U. COLO. L. REV. 683 (1986); Richard Craswell, Two Economic Theories of Enforcing Promises,
in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW, NEW ESSAYS (Peter Benson ed., 2001); RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990).
21. Not surprisingly, much of what shall be discussed with respect to “basic assumption”
defenses in this Article is applicable to other contract defenses, such as fraud and duress.
22. Neoclassical contract law is associated with Corbin and the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, and Llewellyn and the Uniform Commercial Code. John E. Murray, Jr., Contract
Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 869, 870 (2002).
23. The concept of dynamic modern contract law was first discussed by Melvin Eisenberg in an
essay. See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1743 (2000). For further general discussion, see Nancy Kim, Evolving Business and Social
Norms and Interpretation Rules: The Need for a Dynamic Approach to Contract Disputes, 84 NEB.
L. REV. 506 (2005). Karl N. Llewellyn is the scholar most closely associated with a dynamic
approach to contracts. Murray, supra note 22, at 891 (“Llewellyn insisted that the ‘text’ of the
bargain should no longer be the sole basis for discerning obligations. Rather, ‘dynamic, legally
unformulated, fact patterns of common life’ provide an ‘immanent law’ from which the parties’
obligations are derived.” (citing Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in
Commercial Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 781, 782 (1999)). See also Jay M. Feinman, The Significance
of Contract Theory, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1288–1289 (1990).
24. Neoclassical contract law, however, is not interchangeable with “modern” contract law, as
evidenced by the rise in “neoformalism.” See generally Murray, supra note 22. Murray identifies
neoformalism as the reaction to the dynamic character of neoclassical law. Id. at 891.
Neoformalists are those who
would create a world of “plain meaning” interpretation, ridding the adjudication of
contract disputes of any evidence unexpressed in words, reinstating a draconian parol
evidence rule, and even precluding the parties themselves from modifying their contract
or waiving one or more terms in any fashion other than express terms.
Id. at 912. In other words, neoformalism is the antithesis of dynamic contract law.
I distinguish dynamic contract law from neoclassical contract law to emphasize that while
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subjective intent of the parties.25 The existence (or non-existence) of a
party’s subjective intent, however, must then be balanced by public
policy concerns, which reflect societal interests.26 In the case of basic
assumption defenses, the primary policy concern is society’s interest in
the security of economic transactions.
While promulgating the “intent of the parties” is generally agreed to
be one of the primary objectives of contract law, the larger issues of
determining what that intent is and how to effectuate it have not been
resolved. Traditionally, the discussion concerning contractual intent has
revolved around the Williston versus Corbin debate regarding whether
contract interpretation should be objective, or objective with “subjective
elements.” This debate, however, misses the point because it reflects,
rather than resolves, the fundamental tension in contract law between the
interests of the individual and the interests of society.
In this section, I set forth a three-part expanded analysis of intent.
Generally, when a party to a contract seeks to avoid enforcement, she in
essence is claiming that she did not intend to enter into the agreement at
all (but was forced), or did not intend to enter into this agreement (but
was misled, circumstances changed, etc.).27 Consequently, such a
contract should be enforced only if there is a strong countervailing
societal interest supporting enforcement.
neoclassical contract law tends to adopt a more dynamic approach, it is not yet entirely “dynamic” in
nature and retains remnants of its classical contract past (such as the requirement of consideration).
25. While dynamic contract law examines subjective intent, it is rarely “actual” intent simply
because in many cases actual intent is non-existent. If the parties had actually considered the issue
giving rise to the request for avoidance, they would have addressed it. Many scholars object to a
purely subjective standard. For example, Randy Barnett observes:
objectively manifested consent, which usually reflects subjective intent, provides a far
sounder basis for contractual obligation than do subjectively held intentions. Evidence of
subjective intent that is extrinsic to the transaction and was unavailable to the other party
is relevant, if at all, only insofar as it helps a court to ascertain the “objective” meaning of
certain terms.
Barnett, supra note 11, at 304. Yet, the problem with objectively manifested consent is that it
assumes the parties share the same socio-cultural reference points, an assumption that many
anthropologists and linguists dispute. See generally ROLAND BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES (Annette
Lavers, 1972); FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS (Charles Balley &
Albert Sechehaye eds., 1972).
26. Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 1745.
27. Andrew Kull notes:
Though a promise is expressed in unqualified terms, a person does not normally mean to
bind himself to do the impossible, or to persevere when performance proves to be
materially different from what both parties anticipated at the time of formation. Faced
with the adverse consequences of such a disparity, even a person who has previously
regarded his promise as unconditional is likely to protest that he never promised to do
that.
Kull, supra note 6, at 38–39.
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A. Volitional Intent
Contractual assent requires what I refer to as “volitional intent.”
Volitional in this regard is more than an absence of physical coercion; it
means willingness to enter into the contract.28 This type of willingness
assumes both a mental and emotional voluntariness as well as an
unimpaired state of mind on the part of the parties. A failure of
volitional intent is thus found in cases that currently raise the defenses of
intoxication, insanity, duress,29 and procedural unconscionability.30
Could the party seeking avoidance control her actions? Was the
avoiding party coerced into signing the agreement? Volitional intent
assumes the autonomous nature of the avoiding party’s conduct. In other
words, was the act of contracting desired? Consequently, the nonavoiding party’s conduct is relevant, but only to the extent that it affects
the avoiding party’s autonomy. Basic assumption defenses do not
usually involve an absence of volitional intent.31 Accordingly, the
remainder of this Article will focus primarily on the cognitive and
contextual purposive aspects of intent.
B. Cognitive Intent
A fundamental component of intent is that the contracting parties
understood what they were doing. In other words, not only should the
parties act voluntarily when they enter into an agreement, but they should
know what it is that they are voluntarily agreeing to do. An inquiry into

28. In so doing, I adopt the typical dictionary definition of “volition.” Webster’s, for example,
defines volition as follows: “1. An act of willing, choosing, or deciding. 2. A conscious choice :
DECISION. 3. Power or capability of choosing : WILL.” WEBSTER’S II NEW COLLEGE
DICTIONARY 1238 (1995). A larger issue is the distinction that should be made between a volitional
intent to enter into the transaction and the volitional intent to enter into the written contract. This is
a distinction that arises most often with form agreements, including click-wrap and shrink-wrap
agreements. See generally Nancy Kim, Clicking and Cringing, 86 OR. L. REV. 797 (2007).
29. These defenses may also acknowledge an absence of one or more of the other types of
intent as well.
30. A lack of volitional intent would be found with respect to procedural, as opposed to
substantive, unconscionability. Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s
New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 489–90 (1967). In many cases, however, the distinction
between “procedural” and “substantive” unconscionability become blurred, particularly since
substantively unfair terms are often the result of bargaining naughtiness.
31. There may, however, be cases that involve basic assumption defenses as well as defenses
where there is an absence of volitional intent. More specifically, the same fact pattern may involve
both a basic assumption defense such as mistake, and a defense evidencing an absence of volitional
intent, such as duress. In that case, however, the duress claim would indicate the lack of volitional
intent, not the mistake claim.
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cognitive intent32 asks what information the avoiding party had when he
or she entered into the contract. Was the avoiding party operating under
a belief about a material fact that was wrong (i.e., a mistaken “basic
assumption”)? Was the avoiding party tricked or misled by the other
party? Had the avoiding party considered the possibility of the
occurrence of the excusing event (i.e., was there conscious ignorance or a
conscious allocation of risk)? In every contracting situation, each party
has limited knowledge and is usually aware of its limited knowledge.33
The cognitive facet of intent, however, does not refer to what a party
actually knows (or does not know). Cognitive intent takes into account
what the parties considered at the time the contract was made. It
captures any conscious and express risk allocation between the parties,
although it does not consider default risk allocation.34 It does not require
that the parties expressly address the excusing condition in the written
agreement. On the other hand, it does not require that the excusing
condition be unforeseeable. Judicial recognition of cognitive intent is
most evident in cases that raise the contract defenses of fraud, mistake
and unconscionability. Cognitive intent also captures the rationale
underlying some cases involving the defenses of intoxication and
immaturity.
C. Contextual Purposive Intent
In order to determine whether a party in fact intended to enter into a
contract, it is necessary to examine both why the party entered into the
contract, and the relevant circumstances.35 In other words, contextual
purposive intent examines a party’s motive in entering into the contract.36
The relevant circumstances include both those existing at the time the
contract was made as well as those arising after contract formation.37
32. DiMatteo describes a “second-order intent” that would “imbu[e] the reasonable person with
the knowledge of what the parties knew and what they should have known.” Larry A. DiMatteo,
The Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable Person Standard and the Subjectivity of Judgment,
48 S.C. L. REV. 293, 318 (1997). Cognitive intent reflects aspects of DiMatteo’s second-order
intent, but differs from it in that it focuses on the subjective intent of the party.
33. Kull, supra note 6, at 2.
34. See discussion infra Part III.B.
35. Contextual purposive intent is captured in Karl Llewellyn’s vision of a “contextual
agreement.” See John E. Murray, Jr., The Article 2 Prism: The Underlying Philosophy of Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 1–8 (1981) (discussing Llewellyn’s views).
36. For a discussion of when a “mistake in motive” should provide relief, see James Gordley,
Mistake in Contract Formation, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 433 (2004). Gordley believes that in most
cases, errors in motive should not warrant relief, but that in certain cases, they do, and should. Id. at
435, 461–68.
37. The importance of examining contractual relations at moments other than at the time of
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Contextual purposive intent acknowledges concepts of fairness and
substantive justice that are hidden in many of the defense doctrines. It
requires—in fact, assumes—that the avoiding party acted honestly with
respect to her conduct and intention in entering into the agreement.38 For
example, a promisor who lied to a promisee could not escape contractual
liability by claiming that his contextual purposive intent, or motive, in
entering into the contract was not to perform, but was instead to mislead
the promisee into undertaking some action.39 The promisee, on the other
hand, would be able to avoid contract enforcement. This requirement of
good faith corresponds to the ordinary dictionary definition of the term.40
To the extent, however, that good faith implies a norm, such as
“commercial reasonableness,”41 that standard does not apply with respect
to the determination of intent.42
contract formation has been noted by other scholars. For example, Barnhizer has noted:
[T]he relative bargaining power of the parties can shift throughout their interaction. But
courts have no consistent approach to the point at which they will assess inequality of
bargaining power. Some courts, for example, analyze relative bargaining power at the
time of the initial offer. Others look to the bargaining power existing at the time of
contracting or even at the eventual outcome of the parties’ bargain. Given the dynamic
nature of the power relationship on the level of individual contracts, the choice of timing
for analysis will significantly affect that analysis.
Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139, 232–33 (2005).
38. For a discussion of the role of intent in promissory fraud cases, see generally IAN AYRES &
GREGORY KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES: THE LAW OF MISREPRESENTED INTENT (2005). The
authors of that book analyze the intent of the promisor in situations where the innocent promisee
seeks either to enforce the misrepresentation or sue for reliance based upon the false promise. Id. at
16–17. My analysis, on the other hand, considers the intent of the promisor in cases where the
promisor wishes to avoid contract enforcement. A promisor who never intended to fulfill her
promise would not be allowed to escape her contractual obligations on the basis of lack of intent due
to the lack of good faith.
39. This would be an example of promissory fraud. See generally AYRES & KLASS, supra note
38.
40. The Oxford Dictionary defines “good faith” as “honesty or sincerity of intention.” OXFORD
DICTIONARY 585 (9th ed. 1995). Although good faith means honesty, mere negligence does not
amount to bad faith. In other words, a party who acts honestly but negligently may still be acting in
good faith. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 157 cmt. a (1981) (“The mere fact
that a mistaken party could have avoided the mistake by the exercise of reasonable care does not
preclude . . . avoidance [on the basis of mistake]”). Ayres and Klass discuss the role of motive, but
primarily with respect to determining whether the promisor intended to defraud or mislead the
promisee. AYRES & KLASS, supra note 38, at 135–40.
41. The U.C.C., for example, has interpreted good faith to mean “honesty in fact and the
observance of reasonable . . . standards of fair dealing in the trade.” U.C.C. § 2-103 (1998). The
Restatement provides that “[e]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair
dealing in its performance and its enforcement.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205
(1981). For a critical evaluation of the way courts currently employ the doctrine of good faith, see
Emily M.S. Houh, The Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law: A (Nearly) Empty Vessel?, 2005
UTAH L. REV. 1 (2005).
42. That standard is, however, relevant to the second part of a dynamic analysis, which
concerns whether avoiding the contract will undermine the security of transactions. Trade norms
may be relevant, however, in determining the veracity of a party's claimed cognition or contextual
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Contextual purposive intent is currently reflected primarily in
successful cases raising the defense of unconscionability,43 undue
influence, frustration of purpose, and commercial impracticability.
Again, the rationale underlying any of these contract defenses may
include a lack of the other facets of intent discussed above. Most
changed circumstances contract defenses, for example, indicate a lack of
both cognitive intent (because of the failure to consider and accurately
predict the future) and contextual purposive intent. Facts indicating a
lack of contextual purposive intent do not necessarily also indicate a lack
of cognitive intent. For example, a grieving widower who signs his
property over to his deceased beloved wife’s family may not lack
cognitive intent, but may lack contextual purposive intent. His purpose
in entering into the agreement is not to convey his property, but to
demonstrate his gratitude and affection to his wife’s memory.44 Thus, in
some cases, contextual purposive intent may capture the function that
consideration had under classical contract law.
Both cognitive and contextual purposive intent involve certain “tacit
assumptions”45 about the proposed agreement. A party’s rationale for
entering into an agreement may be undermined where a party’s tacit
assumptions prove to be invalid. In such a case, it may no longer be
accurate to say that the party intended to enter into the agreement given
the circumstances as they actually were or turned out to be. Thus,
consideration of cognitive, and especially contextual purposive, intent
requires disregarding the parol evidence and plain meaning rules.
Although this sounds radical in concept, as Part III illustrates, many
courts already construe both rules so as to minimize or undermine their
impact.46

purposive intent.
43. Contextual purposive intent will tend to demonstrate “substantive” unconscionability. See
Leff, supra note 30, at 509 (discussing the drafting history of substantive unconscionablility).
44. I thank H.G. Prince for sharing this example with me.
45. FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 743. Fuller and Eisenberg note that “[w]ords like
‘intention’ . . . imply a conscious state involving an awareness of alternatives and a deliberate choice
among them. It is, however, plain that there is a psychological state that can be described as a ‘tacit
assumption,’ which does not involve a consciousness of alternatives.” Id. at 744 (emphasis omitted).
46. See Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1729–30 (1997) (discussing how many courts cite the plain meaning rule
yet fail to adhere to it); Harry G. Prince, Contract Interpretation in California: Plain Meaning, Parol
Evidence, and Use of the “Just Result” Principle, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 557, 570 (1998) (noting that
California courts tend to engage in a contextual analysis despite citing the plain meaning rule). See
Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual
Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 534 (1998) (discussing how courts may adopt a “hard” or
“soft” version of the parol evidence rule).
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If the furtherance of individual autonomy were the only rationale
underlying contract enforcement, one might argue that only subjective
intent should be relevant, and that a party should always be able to
escape contractual liability in the event that the party misunderstood the
terms of an agreement or simply changed her mind. Yet, a completely
subjective standard would decrease the reliability of agreements, and
would consequently impede the flow of transactions.
Thus,
consideration of the party’s subjective intent must be tempered by the
other objective of contract law—to encourage promissory transactions by
ensuring the security of transactions. Classical contract law strove to
reconcile these two competing objectives by analyzing the disputed
exchange from the standpoint of a “reasonable man.”47 Although created
in order to accommodate the twin goals of contract law,
“reasonableness” supplants them.48 It collapses the two primary
objectives of contract law into one standard. Modern contract law also
adopts the objective theory, albeit with “subjective elements.” A tension
arises in contract law between the objective theory’s goal of norm
creation and reinforcement, and the subjective theory’s deference to
individuals’ desires. This tension manifests itself in the law’s approach
to contract defenses. I propose an alternative approach that balances the
three facets of intent against society’s interest in the security of
transactions, which, in turn, promotes market exchanges in a credit
economy. The following diagram illustrates this approach:

47. Feinman, supra note 23, at 1285–89.
48. As my colleague Tom Barton pointed out, the objective standard may actually undermine
both of contract law’s objectives by ignoring individual autonomy in a given case, and because a
“reasonable person” may, due to bounded rationality, engage in economically inefficient
transactions.
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Dynamic Approach to Contracts

Policy—
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Contractual
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Volitional intent analysis asks whether the party wanted to enter into
the transaction. Cognitive intent analysis asks whether the party
understood what she or he was doing. Contextual purposive intent
analysis considers the party’s reason or motive for entering into the
transaction. In the following section, I examine each of the basic
assumption defenses in the context of a given case, and then analyze the
case through the prism of the aforementioned expanded intent analysis.
III. APPLYING THE INTENT ANALYSIS TO BASIC ASSUMPTION DEFENSES
Basic assumption defenses can be divided into two categories—those
based upon facts existing at the time of contract formation, and those
based upon facts arising after contract formation. The distinction
between the two is a legacy of classical contract law’s fixation on
formation, and unnecessarily complicates analysis of problems arising
from basic assumption errors. As this Section explains, the critical issue
is not the timing of events, but the parties’ contractual intent.
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A. Pre-Formation Basic Assumption Errors
1. Mutual Mistake
As many first-year Contracts professors know,49 the doctrine of
mistake continues to baffle many students who are unable to reconcile
the different outcomes in similar cases.50 The cases where an adversely
affected party has been allowed to avoid a contract on the grounds of
mutual mistake are inconsistent in both reasoning and result.51 In one
familiar case, Wood v. Boynton, the plaintiff sold what she believed to be
a rock to the defendant, who was also unaware of its identity. 52 When
the plaintiff discovered that the rock was in fact an uncut diamond, she
sought to rescind the sale by offering the original price plus interest.53
The buyer refused and the seller sued.54 The court found that the seller
had assumed the risk that the stone would be of greater value than the
price the buyer paid.55
Sherwood v. Walker56 stands in stark contrast. In that case, the
parties entered into an agreement for the sale of a cow.57 Both parties
believed that the cow was barren.58 When the cow was discovered to be
49. See generally Cherry, supra note 7.
50. See also FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 9.3 (“The cases in which an adversely affected
party has been allowed to avoid the contract on [the ground of mutual mistake] are not marked by
their consistency in either reasoning or result.”).
51. Id. See also Melvin A. Eisenberg, Mistake in Contract Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1575
(2003). Eisenberg states:
The problems raised by mistake have been a source of persistent difficulty in contract
law. In part this difficulty results from the complex nature of the underlying issues . . . .
Much of the difficulty, however, results from the use of legal categories and doctrinal
rules that are not sufficiently based on a functional analysis.
Id. at 1575.
Eisenberg proposes a functional analysis of issues raised by mistake which involves
characterizing the type of mistake, and then developing the rules that should govern each type of
mistake in light of applicable social propositions. Id. at 1576–78.
52. 25 N.W. 42, 44 (Wis. 1885). I am somewhat skeptical that the buyer, who was a jeweler,
did not know that the “rock” was actually a diamond, but am of course constrained by the court’s
factual findings in the case.
53. Id. at 43.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 45 (“[I]n the absence of fraud or warranty, the value of the property sold, as
compared with the price paid, is no ground for rescission of sale.”).
56. 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887).
57. Id. at 919.
58. Id. at 920. The dissent points out, however, that the buyer might not have been entirely
convinced of the infertility of the cow Rose of Abermarle:
The record . . . shows that the defendants, when they sold the cow, believed the cow was
not with calf, and barren; that from what the plaintiff had been told by defendants (for it
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with calf, the defendants sought to rescind the agreement by withholding
delivery.59 The court found in favor of the defendants, stating that the
mistake of the parties “was not of the mere quality of the animal, but
went to the very nature of the thing. A barren cow is a substantially
different creature than a breeding one.”60
Under expanded intent analysis, the parties in both cases, while
possessing volitional intent, lacked the cognitive intent to enter into the
contract. In Sherwood v. Walker, the parties believed they were
contracting for an infertile cow, but their information was inaccurate.61
The parties never intended to enter into a contract for the sale and
purchase of a fertile cow—at least not for the price that was paid.62 In
Wood v. Boynton, the parties similarly did not intend to enter into a
contract for the purchase and sale of an uncut diamond.63 In addition, the
sellers in both cases lacked the contextual purposive intent to enter into
the contract given the facts as they actually were. The seller in Wood v.
Boynton intended to sell a rock, not a diamond.64 The seller in Sherwood
v. Walker intended to sell a barren cow, not a fertile one.65 The seller in
each case might have sold the item in question at a higher price if its true
nature were known, but they might just as well not have wanted to sell
the item at all. For example, the seller in Sherwood v. Walker might
have decided to keep the cow to produce calves. The seller in Wood v.
Boynton might have preferred to keep the diamond for herself. The
buyers, on the other hand, lacked cognitive intent, but not contextual
purposive intent. They did not know what they were buying, and so they
could not have had the cognitive intent to engage in the transaction.
Their contextual purposive intent in entering into the transaction was to
does not appear he had any knowledge or facts from which he could form an opinion) he
believed the cow was farrow, but still thought she could be made to breed . . . . There is
no question but that the defendants sold the cow representing her of the breed and quality
they believed the cow to be, and that the purchaser so understood it. And the buyer
purchased her believing her to be of the breed represented by the sellers, and possessing
all the qualities stated, and even more. He believed she would breed. There is no
pretense that the plaintiff bought the cow for beef, and there is nothing in the record
indicating that he would have bought her at all only that he thought she might be made to
breed.
Id. at 924–25 (Sherwood, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 923.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Even if the buyer did intend to buy an uncut diamond, it is clear that the seller did not
intend to sell one. The intent analysis looks at whether both parties intended to enter into the
agreement.
64. 25 N.W. 42, 43–44 (Wis. 1885).
65. Sherwood, 33 N.W. at 923.
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promote their pecuniary interest—something that was not defeated, but
rather promoted when the true facts were discovered. The buyer in
Sherwood v. Walker, for example, intended to buy a cow for financial
reasons (to sell its milk or meat), not for emotional ones (to keep as a
pet).66 The jeweler/buyer in Wood v. Boynton presumably intended to
buy a rock to sell to his customers (i.e. to make money) and not because
he was a rock collector. Neither buyer’s purpose in entering into the
contract was injured or undermined by his discovery.67
Under a dynamic approach, however, the intent inquiry would not
end the analysis of enforceability. A court might still choose to enforce
the contract if society’s interest in the security of transactions
outweighed the lack of intent. In Sherwood v. Walker, the plaintiffs
sought to enforce the contract by claiming title had passed, whereas the
defendants retained possession of the cow and claimed the contract was
executory.68 By contrast, in Wood v. Boynton, the plaintiff seller sought
rescission after the money was paid and possession of the diamond
transferred to the defendant buyer.69 It may be that the societal interest
in ensuring the stability of transactions is undermined to a greater extent
where the agreement has been fully performed (e.g., where property has
already been paid for and delivered).70
The Second Restatement attempts to capture the doctrine of mistake.
It defines mistake as “a belief that is not in accord with the facts.”71 In
order to avoid a contract based on mistake, the mistake must be one as to
a “basic assumption on which the contract was made,”72 and must have a
“material effect on the agreed exchange of performances.”73 The
requirement that the mistake have a “material effect” reflects both the
relevance of intent, and the promotion of a policy of fairness. The intent
aspect considers whether the parties would have entered into the contract
if they had known the facts as they actually were. In addition, the
“material effect” requirement promotes fairness, and thus, contractual
66. Id.
67. I provide this discussion to demonstrate the differences between cognitive and contextual
purposive intent. The fortunate buyer in a mistake situation is not injured and would not be trying to
avoid enforcement of the contract; thus, her intent would not be at issue.
68. Sherwood, 33 N.W. at 919.
69. Wood, 25 N.W. at 44.
70. Andrew Kull has noted the judicial disposition to let “windfalls lie,” meaning that courts
will not enforce executory agreements based upon a mistake, but neither will they rescind fully
performed agreements despite the existence of a mutual mistake. See generally, Kull, supra note 6,
at 6.
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 151 (1981).
72. Id. § 152.
73. Id.
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exchanges. Prospective parties are more likely to engage in contracts if
judicial enforcement in mistake situations is perceived as fair.
A further requirement is that the mistake must relate to facts existing
at the time the contract was made.74 If these requirements are met, the
contract is voidable by the adversely affected party provided that he or
she did not “bear[] the risk of the mistake.”75 A requirement that the
avoiding party not bear the risk of the mistake furthers the fairness
objective.
The remedies for mutual mistakes are avoidance and restitution.76 In
fashioning a remedy, however, the courts often reveal their confusion of
“mutual mistakes” with transcription errors or “mistakes in
transcription.”77 Thus, courts have ordered reformation78 after finding
the existence of a “mutual mistake.” For example, in Shupe v. Nelson, a
California appellate court stated that “[r]eformation may be had for a
mutual mistake or for the mistake of one party which the other knew or
suspected, but in either situation the purpose of the remedy is to make the
written contract truly express the intention of the parties.” 79 In Shupe,
the plaintiffs sued the defendants after access to the roadway from their
garage and driveway was eliminated by construction of a fence.80 The
lot owned by plaintiffs was part of a common housing development
consisting of four lots.81 As part of the development plan, all four of the
lots were to have access to the roadway.82 The access right to the
74. Id. § 151 cmt. a.
75. Id. § 152. A party bears the risk of the mistake in the following instances:
(a) the risk is allocated to him by agreement of the parties, or (b) he is aware, at the time
the contract is made, that he has only limited knowledge with respect to the facts to
which the mistake relates but treats his limited knowledge as sufficient, or (c) the risk is
allocated to him by the court on the ground that it is reasonable in the circumstances to do
so.
Id. § 154.
76. FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 9.3.
77. See Eisenberg, supra note 51, at 1610–11 (defining mistranscriptions as a “special case of
mechanical errors” where the appropriate relief is to amend the writing to reflect the actual bargain).
78. See CORBIN, supra note 18, § 614 (“Reformation is not a proper remedy for the
enforcement of terms to which the defendant never assented . . . .”). See also Kull, supra note 6, at
37 (stating that reformation is an innovative form of relief when mistake is present). Interestingly,
the availability of “reformation” as a remedy in mutual mistake cases is expressly granted under
section 3399 of the California Civil Code, even though reformation is not the typical remedy for
mistake. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3399 (West 1997) (allowing revision of a contract in the case of
mutual mistake).
79. Shupe v. Nelson, 62 Cal. Rptr. 352, 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
80. Id. at 355, n.1.
81. Id. at 355–56.
82. See id. at 356 (stating that the “plan . . . intended to reserve . . . joint use and benefit for all
four lots”).
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roadway for the plaintiffs’ lot, however, was omitted from the deeds.
The trial court found that the omission of the reservation of access rights
was the result of a “mutual mistake,” and ordered a reformation of all of
the deeds to the four lots to include the omitted access rights.83 The
appellate court agreed, stating that “[w]here the failure of the written
contract to express the intention of the parties is due to the inadvertence
of both of them, the mistake is mutual and the contract may be revised on
the application of the party aggrieved.”84 Yet, the facts indicate not a
“mutual mistake” as to a “basic assumption,” but a transcription error,
something which the court acknowledges in stating that the defendant:
[F]ailed to properly instruct the title company at the time of the 1961
conveyances that [the plaintiffs’] lot was part of the same ownership
and that the easements and right to use [the roadway] should also be
included for the benefit of that lot. Mistake by a scrivener or draftsman
in reducing the intent of the parties to writing is ground for
reformation.85

While the court inaccurately categorized the type of mistake, it
focused on what was important—the intent of the parties. In Shupe, the
parties intended to enter into an agreement that reserved access rights to
the plaintiffs’ property, but the agreement failed to reflect that intent.
Cognitive and contextual purposive intent existed, but only with respect
to the deeds as reformed. Conversely, the deeds as actually written
should not have been enforced because both facets of intent to enter into
the contract were lacking. Although inconsistent in its analysis of
mistake, the court ordered the correct remedy, implementing what the
parties intended.
In another case, Par 3, Inc. v. Livingston,86 the Nebraska Supreme
Court mischaracterized the remedy in explaining the basis for nonenforcement. In Par 3, the defendant Livingston, president of a
corporation called Castle Development, entered into a contract with the
plaintiffs pursuant to which the corporation would purchase and plant
trees for a proposed real estate and golf course development tentatively
called Castle Brook.87 The contract was signed by representatives of the
plaintiffs and by Livingston.88 The words “TITLE/CASTLEBROOK”
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id. at 357.
Id. at 358.
686 N.W.2d 369 (Neb. 2004).
Id. at 371.
Id.
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were typed below Livingston’s signature, and above the word “TITLE,”
the defendant had written “Pres.”89 The Castle Brook project failed to
develop and the plaintiffs filed suit against Livingston for breach of
contract.90 In his answer, Livingston alleged that he was not personally
liable on the contract because he was acting in his capacity as president
of Castle Development.91 The district court agreed, and dismissed the
plaintiffs’ petitions.92 The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that Livingston
signed on behalf of an entity—Castle Brook—that was never
incorporated, making him personally liable under Nebraska law.93 They
further claimed that the court erred in using extrinsic and parol evidence
to add to and vary the terms of a clear and unambiguous contract.94
Livingston argued that he intended to enter into the contract as president
of Castle Development and that he was unaware at the time he signed the
contract that the name of the entity on the document was incorrect.95
The district court concluded that Livingston intended to, and did,
sign the contract as president of Castle Development, and not in his
personal capacity.96 On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the district
court erred in reforming the contract.97 The Nebraska Supreme Court
first noted that reformation may be had “when there has been either a
mutual mistake or a unilateral mistake caused by fraud or inequitable
conduct on the part of the party against whom reformation is sought.”98
The court then found that the lower court’s conclusion that Livingston
was not personally liable “was not based upon any alleged mistake in the
contract, but was instead premised on the conclusion that none of the
parties involved in the contract intended to incur personal liability.”99
The Nebraska Supreme Court thus concluded that “the district court did
not reform the contract.”100 Yet, the finding that Livingston was not
personally liable could be sustained only if there was a mistake in
transcription and, at least, a consequent conceptual reformation of the
contract to indicate that he signed the document as president of Castle
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 372.
94. Id. at 373.
95. Id. at 372.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 373.
98. Id.
99. Id. In addition, plaintiff corporations’ president “testified that he believed he was dealing
with a corporation when he entered into the contract.” Id. at 372.
100. Id. at 373.
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Development and not Castle Brook. Furthermore, the court claimed that
the evidence of Livingston’s intent did not “add to and vary” the terms of
the contract.101 On the contrary, the agreement stated in plain and
unambiguous language that Livingston was signing the agreement on
behalf of Castle Brook. The court denied the applicability of traditional
contract law principles in order to address the important and more
relevant issue of whether the parties intended for Livingston to incur
personal liability under the agreement. The Par 3 court’s conclusion is
supported using my proposed intent analysis. Livingston lacked the
cognitive intent to enter into the transaction because he did not
understand that the contract was between himself personally (and not the
corporation) and the plaintiffs. His contextual purposive intent in
entering into the contract was to act as an agent for his company in
conducting business—not to engage in the business transaction on his
own behalf. Because the plaintiffs also believed that Livingston was
acting on behalf of Castle Development, and not as an individual, the
security of transactions objective was not undermined by dismissing the
plaintiffs’ claims.
The parties to a contract often are at a loss themselves as to which
basic assumption defense is applicable, given the similarities of the
defenses, and that the same factual circumstances give rise to different
defenses. In one case, Nelson v. Cowles Ford, the plaintiff buyer sued
the defendant car dealership after purchasing a used Ford Expedition
with an altered odometer.102 The defendant car dealership raised the
jumbled defense of “impossibility due to mutual mistake.”103 The court
addressed the defendant’s confusion regarding the defenses as follows:
Whether Cowles Ford intended to raise the distinct defense of mutual
mistake is unclear, but in any event unimportant, because neither
defense is applicable here. Mutual mistake only allows the injured
party to void the contract . . . . Nelson [the plaintiff] is clearly the
injured party because he paid for a vehicle with a market value much
higher than he received. Impossibility under Virginia law exists only
upon the occurrence of an event, the non-occurrence of which was the
basic assumption upon which the contract was made . . . . Cowles Ford
can identify no intervening occurrence in the case at bar.104

101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 374.
77 Fed. App’x 637, 639 (4th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 643.
Id.
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In some cases, the court itself will assist a party who relies upon an
inapplicable defense. In Gutierrez v. Schultz, the plaintiff Gutierrez filed
a negligence complaint for injuries after being struck by a truck driven
by the defendant.105 The defendant Schultz filed a motion to dismiss,
attaching a copy of a draft in the amount of $6000 from Allstate
Insurance, made payable to and endorsed by Gutierrez.106 The lower
court granted the motion to dismiss and the plaintiff appealed, claiming,
among other things, that “the court erred in not permitting parol evidence
on the question of the issues of fraud, misrepresentation, and mutual
mistake in connection with the draft.”107 During hearings on the motion
to dismiss, the plaintiff “sought to introduce evidence relating to the
circumstances surrounding the acceptance and negotiation of the Allstate
draft.”108 The court sustained defense counsel’s motion to exclude the
evidence based in part on the parol evidence rule.109 Gutierrez made an
offer of proof and testified that an Allstate adjuster visited him while he
was in the hospital.110 The adjuster told him that the company was
concerned about his injuries and that Allstate “would take care of
everything,” including lost wages (approximately $14,000) and medical
expenses (approximately $2500).111 The plaintiff claimed that the
adjuster also told him that “if he needed money, Allstate would advance
it to him.”112 Gutierrez claimed that two weeks before he received the
check (which purported to be in exchange for a full and complete
release), he had another conversation with the adjuster, and indicated that
he would be amenable to a fair settlement, meaning lost wages, bills, and
medical expenses.113 There was no agreement on a settlement amount,
according to Gutierrez.114 Approximately two or three weeks after this
conversation, Gutierrez received a check for $6000 that contained on its
face, in normal size print, the following language: “In payment of any
and all claims including bodily injury arising from accident of 12-12-78
in Sterling, Illinois.”115 Gutierrez testified that he understood the check

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

440 N.E.2d 451, 452–53 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
Id. at 452.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 452–53.
Id. at 453.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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to be partial payment only.116 He further testified that two or three weeks
after he received the draft check, he received a release form from
Allstate, which he threw away.117 After the offer of proof concluded, the
lower court opined “that the check was a release of all claims, and that
the plaintiff’s endorsement of it estopped him from pursuing the
negligence action.”118 The lower court further stated its opinion that
Allstate was not liable for fraud or misrepresentation, and concluded that
there was no mutual mistake of fact.119
The Appellate Court for the Third District of Illinois reversed and
remanded. Skirting the issues of fraud and mutual mistake, the court
stated:
The threshold issue in the instant case is not whether the release should
be set aside based upon fraud or mutual mistake, but whether there was
a release at all. The plaintiff argues that the court erred in not
considering his evidence concerning the circumstances leading up to
and surrounding his endorsement of the check. Plaintiff’s position is
that his evidence indicated that it was not his intention, by endorsing
and cashing the check, to release and fully settle his claim . . . . The
insurer argues that the check on its face clearly and unambiguously
evidences an intent to release and settle all claims arising from the
accident.
In so arguing, it concludes that the document is
unequivocally a release and settlement of all claims and that any
evidence to the contrary is impermissible. We disagree, and conclude
that plaintiff’s evidence ought to have been considered, since it was
relevant to the issue of the intentions of the parties with respect to the
check.120

The court focused on contractual intent, but not as traditionally defined.
While the plaintiff clearly had the volitional intent to accept the check
(and thus, the settlement), contextual purposive intent and cognitive
intent were lacking. The defendant sought to keep out the events that
occurred prior to the cashing of the check under the parol evidence rule;
however, those circumstances are relevant in examining the existence (or
non-existence) of both cognitive and contextual purposive intent. The
court noted that “the evidence of surrounding circumstances, which
ought to have been considered on the issue of intentions, indicates that
the insurance agent had represented that the company would take care of

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 454.
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everything, including lost wages.”121 In other words, the cashing of the
draft in a vacuum does not provide an accurate picture of what the
plaintiff intended when he so acted. The extrinsic evidence was needed
to determine why the plaintiff cashed the check. Was it to settle the
claim with Allstate, or to accept part payment of a forthcoming
settlement?
In addition, the court indicated that cognitive intent was lacking
when it stated the following:
In the instant case, the language on the check did not use the words
release, discharge, settle or even payment in full. Furthermore, the
language of release . . . herein was in regular size print in the middle of
the front of the check. We are not dealing in this case with a document
entitled release and settlement, but rather with a document whose
primary stated purpose and whose outward formal characteristics
indicate that it is merely a check. Even assuming that the language
used would be understood by the layman as a release and settlement, it
would be inappropriate to assess that language divorced from the
document as a whole, both its substantive and formal aspects. This
document, except for the sentence with respect to what the payment
was being made for, was in all other respects a check. We find it
conceivable and reasonable, in light of the form of the document and
the language used . . . that plaintiff herein felt that the check he
received was merely payment towards his claim, and not full payment
evidencing a final settlement and release of his claim.122

Thus, the court’s objective is to determine the parties’ multi-faceted
intent. The $6000 draft was filled out by a typewriter, with Gutierrez’s
name as claimant listed just below the name of Schultz as the insured.123
Just under Gutierrez’s name, in the same size type, next to the words, “In
payment of” were the words, “Any and all claims including bodily injury
arising from accident of 12-12-78 in Sterling, Ill.”124 As the dissent
states, “I cannot believe that any reasonable person would interpret that
statement to mean anything other than what it says; that the payment was
intended to bar all personal injury claims of plaintiff arising out of the
accident.”125 Yet, what the appellate court considered was not the intent
of the “reasonable person,” but Gutierrez’s actual, subjective intent,

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 455.
Id.
Id. at 456.
Id. (Barry, J., dissenting).
Id.
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taking into account the cognitive and contextual purposive facets of
intent.126
2. Unilateral Mistake
In mutual mistake cases, both parties are operating under the same
misperception as to material facts.127 In unilateral mistake cases, only
one party has an erroneous perception as to the facts.128 In order to avoid
a contract on the grounds of unilateral mistake, the adversely affected
party must show the requirements necessary for mutual mistake. In
addition, the adversely affected party must also show either that the
effect of the mistake would make enforcement of the contract
unconscionable or that the other party had reason to know of the mistake,
or caused the mistake.129 If the doctrinal distinction between unilateral
and mutual mistake is weak, the factual distinction is sometimes
imperceptible.130 Not surprisingly, avoiding parties often seem confused
about whether they should claim mutual or unilateral mistake, as the
same facts often give rise to claims for both defenses.131
Courts generally have been reluctant to allow avoidance in cases
where parties have sought relief on the grounds of unilateral mistake.132
Typically, successful cases have involved technical or computational
errors.133 For example, in M.F. Kemper Construction Co. v. City of Los
126. See id. at 455 (majority opinion).
127. FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, at § 9.3. A mutual mistake should be distinguished from a
misunderstanding, where two parties attach different meanings to their language. Id. at § 9.2.
128. Id. at § 9.4.
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (1981).
130. See ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 597 (1960). See also Eric
Rasmusen & Ian Ayres, Mutual and Unilateral Mistake in Contract Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 309,
312 (1993).
131. See Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Idacorp, Inc., 379 F.3d 641, 645 (9th Cir. 2004) (plaintiff
utility company based complaint on theories of mutual mistake, unilateral mistake, duress and
unconscionability); Am. Annuity Group, Inc. v. Guaranty Reassurance Corp. Liquidating Trust, 55
Fed. App’x 255, 256 (6th Cir. 2003) (defendant trust filed an amended counterclaim seeking
reformation on the basis of mutual mistake, unilateral mistake, and fraud); Indep. Order of Foresters
v. Donald, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 157 F.3d 933, 936–37 (2d Cir. 1998) (purchaser sued on the basis
of both mutual and unilateral mistake); Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 929 F.2d 960, 962 (3d Cir.
1991) (appellant corporation claimed settlement agreement was the result of a “mutual mistake” or
in the alternative, a “unilateral mistake”). See also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND
ECONOMICS 258–59 (1988) (stating that courts often use the term “mutual mistake” in decisions not
to enforce a promise and “unilateral mistake” in decisions to enforce a promise, thus emptying the
terms of their original meanings).
132. See, e.g., M.F. Kemper Constr. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 235 P.2d 7, 9–12 (Cal. 1951)
(“Generally, relief is refused for error in judgment and allowed only for clerical or mathematical
mistakes.”).
133. Id.
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Angeles, the California Supreme Court allowed a construction company
to cancel a bid it had submitted on public construction work.134 The
company had unintentionally omitted a $301,769 item in its bid, and did
not discover its error until after the bids were opened.135 Pursuant to the
city charter, the notice inviting bids provided that each bid must be
submitted by a bond for an amount not less than ten percent of the bid
amount as a guarantee that the bidder would enter into the contract if it
were awarded to him.136 The charter further provided that after the bids
were opened, they could not be withdrawn without the city’s consent.137
All submitted bids would be “subject to acceptance by the city for a
period of three months” even though the notice reserved to the city the
right to reject any and all bids.138 The company immediately notified the
city of its error and two days later, withdrew its bid.139 A few days later,
the city passed a resolution accepting the erroneous bid.140 The company
refused to enter into a contract, and the city awarded the contract to the
next lowest bidder and demanded forfeiture of the company’s bond.141
The California Supreme Court agreed with the lower court that the
company’s unilateral mistake permitted cancellation of the submitted bid
and allowed the city to recover nothing.142
Yet, the California Supreme Court came to a different conclusion in
another case involving a computational error made by a contractor in
Drennan v. Star Paving Co.143 The defendant subcontractor had
submitted a $7131.60 bid to plaintiff general contractor for certain
paving work.144 The plaintiff incorporated that bid in his own bid and
“submitted it with the name of [the] defendant as the subcontractor for
the paving.”145 The plaintiff was awarded the contract, and stopped by
the defendant’s office the following day.146 At that time, the defendant
informed the plaintiff that he had made a mistake in the bid for the
paving work and refused to do the paving work for less than $15,000.147
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 11.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9–10.
Id. at 12–13.
333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958).
Id. at 758.
Id.
Id. at 758–59.
Id.
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The plaintiff finally engaged another firm to do the work for about
$11,000.148 The California Supreme Court affirmed the lower court
decision in favor of the plaintiff and found that the doctrine of
promissory estoppel could be used to make the offer binding. The
California Supreme Court distinguished M.F. Kemper on the grounds
that in that case there was no reasonable, detrimental reliance because
“the bidder’s mistake was known or should have been to the offeree, and
the offeree could be placed in status quo.”149
These two cases can be reconciled using a dynamic approach that
adopts an expanded intent analysis. Both the contractor in M.F. Kemper
and the subcontractor in Drennan lacked cognitive intent to enter into the
contract. Both parties submitted bids based upon computational errors
and both parties would not have entered into the contract if they had been
made aware of their mistakes. Furthermore, both parties likely lacked
contextual purposive intent. Their objective was presumably to make a
profit on the services they would provide, which was likely undermined
by their mistakes. Given the lack of both cognitive and contextual
purposive intent, the societal interest in ensuring the security of
transactions must be rather significant to compel enforcement. In M.F.
Kemper, the non-avoiding party had not accepted the bid, and there was
no detrimental reliance.150 Given the nature of the bidding process, the
city was uninjured. The city had only to go to the next lowest bidder, as
that bidder was compelled to keep its bid open for three months.151
Furthermore, there was no justifiable expectation interest as the
contractor informed the city of his mistake only hours after the bids were
opened, prior to acceptance, and with plenty of time for the city to find
another contractor.152 In other words, the non-enforcement of the bid in
M.F. Kemper was unlikely to deter future transactions.
On the other hand, the facts of Drennan provide a compelling
rationale for enforcement. Unlike in M.F. Kemper, the non-mistaken
party detrimentally relied on the mistake in committing to perform the
general contract.153 To make matters worse, the mistaken party did not
immediately notify the other party of his mistake and waited until the
plaintiff paid him a visit.154 The failure to enforce the agreement in

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 759.
Id. at 761.
M.F. Kemper Constr. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 235 P.2d 7, 9–13 (Cal. 1951).
Id. at 9–11.
Id.
Drennan, 333 P.2d at 759–60.
Id. at 758–59.
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Drennan, given the existence of detrimental reliance and good faith on
the part of the non-mistaken party (who spent several months trying to
get other bids and who accepted the lowest of those bids),155 would likely
deter similarly situated parties from future transactions, or more likely,
burden the contracting process with onerous liability terms.
In another contractor case, the California Supreme Court allowed
rescission of a contract on the grounds of unilateral mistake even though
the contract was accepted prior to discovery of the mistake. In Elsinore
Union Elementary School District v. Kastorff, the defendant, a building
contractor, was sued by the plaintiff school district for damages after
refusing to perform a winning construction bid.156 The defendant
established that the bid resulted from a good faith mistake made under
the pressure of the frenzied bidding process.157 The bid was accepted on
August 12, and the defendant discovered the clerical error the next
morning.158 That same morning, he notified the school district and asked
to be released from the bid.159 On August 14, the defendant wrote a letter
to the school district again explaining the error and asking to be
released.160 On August 15, “the school district held a special meeting
and voted not to grant Kastorff’s request.”161 On August 28, the school
district gave written notification of award of the contract and submitted a
written contract for signature.162 The defendant refused and the school
district sued.163 Using an expanded intent analysis, the court’s decision
can be explained given that the defendant did not have cognitive or
contextual purposive intent to enter into an agreement based on the bid as
submitted. Furthermore, the call for bids required all bidders to keep
their bids open for a period of forty-five days after the date set for
opening.164 While it is unclear whether the plaintiff had the option of
accepting the next lowest bid, given the frenzied nature of the bidding
process and the safeguards available to the party seeking bids, rescinding
the contract caused minimal, if any, danger to the societal interest in the
security of transactions.

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 761.
353 P.2d 713, 714–15 (Cal. 1960).
Id.
Id. at 714.
Id. at 715.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 715 n.2.
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In a more recent case, Donovan v. RRL Corp., the California
Supreme Court held in favor of a defendant automobile dealer who had
made a typographical error by listing a used Jaguar for sale at a price that
was approximately $12,000 less than what he intended.165 The plaintiff
test-drove the Jaguar, and then told defendant’s salesperson, “Okay. We
will take it at your price, $26,000.”166 Then he was told that the
advertisement was a mistake.167 The sales manager offered to pay for the
plaintiff’s fuel, time, and effort expended in traveling to the dealership,
but the plaintiff refused.168 The sales manager then offered to sell the
plaintiff the vehicle for $37,016, approximately $900 less than the
intended sales price.169 The plaintiff refused and filed suit.170 The
California Supreme Court ruled in favor of the defendant and reversed
the appellate court’s judgment on the grounds that the defendant had
made a unilateral mistake in advertising the sale price of the Jaguar.171 In
so doing, that court stated that to enforce the contract would be
“unconscionable” because the mistake was an error amounting to thirtytwo percent of the intended price.172
In reality, it is unlikely that a $12,000 mistake borne by a luxury car
dealership would be “unconscionable,” especially when that “loss”
includes anticipated profit. In other words, the dealership had paid
$35,000 for the Jaguar.173 Thus, the “actual” loss was closer to $9000.
The court’s decision may be given a more credible explanation using an
expanded intent analysis. The defendant never intended to sell the
vehicle at the advertised price. Thus, there was an absence of volitional,
cognitive, and contextual purposive intent (assuming that the mistake
was made in good faith and not a “bait-and-switch” maneuver).
Furthermore, the plaintiff was notified of the error immediately after
acceptance, and the defendant offered to pay for reliance damages. Thus,
allowing the defendant to avoid the contract would not have a
detrimental effect on the societal interest in the security of
transactions.174
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
Vehicle

27 P.3d 702, 708 (Cal. 2001).
Id. at 707.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 706–07.
Id. at 723–24.
Id. at 722.
This author might have come to a different conclusion on the basis of the California Motor
Code, section 11713.1, “which makes it unlawful for an automobile dealer not to sell a
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3. Misunderstanding
Technically, misunderstandings are not defenses to contracts as they
affect the very formation of a contract. In other words, if the parties
lacked mutual assent, a contract was never formed in the first place, thus
obviating the need for a defense.175
In practice, however,
misunderstandings are used the same way that other contract defenses are
used—to avoid enforcement of a contract. Furthermore, while the
difference between misunderstanding and contract defenses is
theoretically straightforward, the distinction that courts make between
the two is often unclear in application. For example, in Krossa v. All
Alaskan Seafoods, Inc.,176 the Supreme Court of Alaska appears to have
confused misunderstanding with mutual mistake. In that case, “John
Krossa signed a contract with All Alaskan Seafoods to fish for crab in
exchange for a percentage of the gross receipts.”177 The Alaskan
Supreme Court, in affirming the decision of the superior court, concluded
that the contract between the parties was invalid because the parties “had
different understandings of the term ‘gross receipts.’”178
In so
concluding, that court stated that “if the term ‘gross receipts’ as used in
the written agreement had no plain meaning and was instead ambiguous,
we must conclude that no contract existed during that time.”179 Although
Krossa and All Alaskan Seafoods agreed that gross receipts should be
defined as weight times price, they disagreed as to what the price should
be.180 Krossa argued that because the contract contained an integration
clause, the parol evidence rule barred introduction of extrinsic evidence
in construing its meaning.181 The Alaskan Supreme Court disagreed,
stating that the parol evidence rule does not apply “where a contract has
been formed as a result of misrepresentation or mutual mistake.” 182 It
further stated that: “[Where a party offered parol evidence] to show that
the parties did not intend that the [contract] had the meaning the [other
motor vehicle at the advertised price while the vehicle remains unsold.” Id. at 706.
175. See, e.g., Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375, 376 (1864). In Raffles, the parties
entered into a contract for the sale and purchase of cotton scheduled to arrive on the ship Peerless.
Id. at 375. Unknown to the parties, there were two ships named Peerless, and the parties were not
referring to the same one. Id. See also Rasmusen & Ayres, supra note 130, at 310 n.2 (noting that
cases involving misunderstandings are “void” rather than “voidable”).
176. 37 P.3d 411 (Alaska 2001).
177. Id. at 413.
178. Id. at 416.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 417 n.14.
182. Id. (quoting Philbin v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough, 991 P.2d 1263, 1270 (Alaska 1999)).
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party] ascribed to it, not to vary or contradict the terms of the written
contract . . . this was a permissible use of extrinsic evidence to prove
mutual mistake.”183
While the court analyzed the issue as a misunderstanding, it referred
to the basis for non-enforcement as “mutual mistake,” stating that
although a party may avoid a contract based on mistake or
misrepresentation regarding the contract’s meaning, the party loses
power to avoid the contract, “if, after he knows or has reason to know
of the mistake or non-fraudulent misrepresentation . . . he manifests to
the other party his intention to affirm it . . . .”184

If, however, the facts were as alleged, there was no “mutual mistake”
because there was no shared mistaken basic assumption. Rather, there
was a fundamental misunderstanding and therefore, no “meeting of the
minds,” and no contract at all.185 While the court erred with respect to
what to label the basis for contract avoidance, it made clear that the
relevant substantive issue was determining the parties’ intent.186 If one
party did not understand “gross receipts” to mean what the other party
meant, then the contract could be avoided because the party did not have
the cognitive intent to enter into the transaction that the other party
contemplated.187
Not only do courts mislabel misunderstandings as mutual mistakes
(and vice versa), courts often stumble on the interpretive issues
associated with misunderstandings. In City of Everett v. Estate of
Oddmund Sumstad, the buyers purchased at an auction a used safe with a
locked compartment for fifty dollars.188 It was later discovered that the
locked compartment contained $32,207.189 The Supreme Court of
183. Id. (citing Philbin, 991 P.2d at 1270).
184. Id. at 418.
185. See supra note 175 and accompanying text. But cf. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, ALLEVIATING
MISTAKES: REVERSAL AND FORGIVENESS FOR FLAWED PERCEPTIONS 14–15 (2004) (noting that the
Peerless case was a “rare exception” and that “the mere fact that a party has a different perception of
the other’s understanding of the meaning of their language does not prevent a contract from
arising.”) “A court will almost invariably apply an objective standard and find that the meaning of
the language accords with the understanding of one or the other of the parties.” Id. at 14–15. Keith
Rowley disagrees, stating that “Farnsworth overgeneralized in writing that a misunderstanding will
not prevent contract formation. In fact, a mutual misunderstanding will prevent contract formation.”
Keith Rowley, To Err Is Human, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1407, 1411 (2006) (reviewing E. ALLEN
FARNSWORTH, ALLEVIATING MISTAKES: REVERSAL AND FORGIVENESS FOR FLAWED PERCEPTIONS
(2004)).
186. See Krossa, 37 P.3d at 416 (describing the requirements of a valid contract).
187. Id.
188. 631 P.2d 366, 367 (Wash. 1981).
189. Id.
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Washington stated that Washington contract law was governed by an
objective theory, which “lays stress on the outward manifestation of
assent made by each party to the other. The subjective intention of the
parties is irrelevant.”190 The court further added that a party’s intent
must be imputed “corresponding to the reasonable meaning of a person’s
words and acts.”191 Yet, in distinguishing the case before it from West
Coast Airlines, Inc. v. Miner’s Aircraft & Engine Service, Inc.,192 the
court seemed to confuse objective from subjective intent:
In West Coast Airlines, the aircraft engines were clearly not intended to
be sold to Junk Traders. The inclusion of the engines in the sale of
scrap metal was inadvertent and wholly unknown to both parties.
Neither party was aware the sealed containers might hold anything
other than scrap metal. Furthermore, West Coast Airlines retained the
Federal documents that must be transferred to the purchaser upon the
sale of an aircraft engine, a clear indication it did not intend to pass title
to the engines.193

West Coast Airlines’ “outward manifestation,” as viewed by a
reasonable person, indicates that it did, in fact, intend to sell the sealed
containers containing the engines. The court differentiated the case
before it by stating that the auctioneer had told the bidders that the safe
had come from an estate, that the safe was locked, and that the contents
of the safe had not been opened by the auctioneer.194 Yet, an
acknowledgment by the auctioneer that the safe has not been opened is
not the same as agreeing to sell for fifty dollars a safe containing over
thirty thousand dollars.
The distinction between City of Everett v. Estate of Oddmund
Sumstad and West Coast Airlines, Inc. v. Miner’s Aircraft & Engine
Service, Inc. is not that in one case the party objectively manifested
assent, and in the other it did not. In both cases, the seller objectively
manifested assent to the sale, but the seller in West Coast Airlines lacked
both the cognitive intent and contextual purposive intent to enter into the
actual transaction. Not only was the seller in West Coast Airlines
unaware that the sealed containers held aircraft engines, the seller did not
even consider the possibility that it might contain something other than
scrap material.195 Furthermore, the seller’s contextual purposive intent in
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.
Id.
403 P.2d 833 (Wash. 1965).
Estate of Oddmund Sumstad, 631 P.2d at 368.
Id.
See West Coast Airlines, 403 P.2d at 835 (discussing the circumstances of the sale).
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selling the scrap metal was both to earn money and to rid its premises of
junk—not to get rid of airplane engines. By contrast, in Estate of
Oddmund Sumstad, the seller (through the auctioneer) made explicit that
he was assuming the risk that the safe might contain something more
valuable than the auction price. In fact, it was precisely that unknown
value that the buyers were bidding upon—not the market value of the
safe or even the “unknown contents” of the safe. The sellers were not
agreeing to sell a safe containing $30,000—they were agreeing to sell a
safe that might contain something valuable within but just as likely might
contain nothing. Both parties were aware of the possibility that the safe
might contain something valuable and each was capitalizing on that
possibility in the way that he thought best—the seller, in the hopes of
getting a higher bid price, and the buyer, in the hopes of discovering a
hidden treasure. While the seller did not know for certain that the safe
contained money, he had expressly considered the possibility that it
might. While the seller may have lacked actual knowledge of the safe’s
contents, he had the cognitive intent to enter into the transaction. The
seller’s contextual purposive intent in entering into the transaction was to
auction the safe at the highest price possible, both to benefit financially
as well as to disencumber himself from the item. Both of these
objectives were met—the seller accepted the highest price and no longer
had to store the safe. The contextual purposive intent of the seller was
not defeated simply because he subsequently discovered that he might
have received a higher price if he had known about the hidden money.
B. Changed Circumstances
Sometimes, a party seeks to avoid a contract as a result of a basic
assumption error regarding the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of a
condition subsequent to contract formation. In Taylor v. Caldwell
(which has been recognized as the first case involving impossibility as a
defense196) the court established the rule that if the existence of a
particular thing is necessary for a party’s performance, then if such thing
is destroyed, the party’s performance under the contract is excused.197 In
that case, the parties entered into a contract whereby Taylor was to use
Caldwell’s music hall for performances on four days, in return for
payment of £100 per day.198 The music hall was accidentally destroyed

196. Gordley, supra note 6, at 521.
197. 122 Eng. Rep. 309, 314 (K.B. 1863) (cited in FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 9.5).
198. Id.
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by fire less than a week before the first performance.199 Taylor sued
Caldwell for breach of contract, claiming damages incurred in
preparation of the performances.200 The court decided that the continued
existence of the music hall was an implied condition of the contract and,
because the music hall was destroyed, Caldwell’s performance was
excused.201
The “implied condition” was a tacit assumption of the parties. The
invalidity of the parties’ tacit assumption reveals an absence of cognitive
intent for both Taylor and Caldwell. Caldwell would not have agreed to
rent out the music hall, and Taylor would not have agreed to rent it, if
either had known the hall would be destroyed by fire. Furthermore, each
party lacked contextual purposive intent to enter into the actual contract
because the fire destroyed both parties’ ability to perform. In other
words, Caldwell never had the intent to enter into an agreement that
required him to deliver possession of a non-existent structure, or one that
needed to be entirely rebuilt. Similarly, Taylor lacked contextual
purposive intent to enter into the contract because he wanted to rent the
premises to stage music performances—something he could no longer do
after the fire. He lacked contextual purposive intent because an event
subsequent to the formation of the contract—the fire—destroyed his
reason for renting the premises. The same circumstances—the fire and
the subsequent destruction of the music hall—defeated the contractual
intent of both parties. Yet, if Caldwell were to sue Taylor for breach of
contract (assuming that there was no provision in the contract specifying
the “condition” in which the music hall would be delivered), Taylor
would not be able to use impossibility as a defense to the contract.
Instead, he would have to resort to the doctrine of frustration of purpose.
The doctrine of frustration of purpose is nearly identical to the
doctrine of impossibility and has been referred to as its “companion
rule.”202 The difference is that with the frustration of purpose doctrine,
“performance remains possible but the expected value of the
performance to the party seeking to be excused has been destroyed” by
the supervening event.203 The third changed circumstances doctrine,

199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Chase Precast Corp. v. John J. Paonessa Co., 566 N.E.2d 603, 605 (Mass. 1991).
203. Id. at 606 (citing Lloyd v. Murphy, 153 P.2d 47, 53 (Cal. 1944)). See also Posner &
Rosenfield, supra note 8, at 85 (“‘Impossibility’ is the rubric used when the carrying out of a
promise is no longer ‘physically possible,’ and ‘frustration of purpose’ when performance of the
promise is physically possible but the underlying purpose of the bargain is no longer attainable.”).
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impracticability, has been referred to as a “catch-all”204 for situations
where performance is physically possible but would entail a much higher
cost than originally expected.205 As Richard Posner and Andrew
Rosenfield have noted, “[t]here is thus no functional distinction between
impossibility and frustration cases on the one hand and impracticability
cases on the other.”206
With all three doctrines, the central issue concerns the allocation of
risk, independent of fault, of the event giving rise to the claim of
impossibility, frustration of purpose,207 or impracticability.
The
208
allocation of risk, however, is not always readily determinable. Posner
and Rosenfield have argued that a party should bear the risk if he or she
is in a better position than the other party to foresee the risk, insure
against it, or prevent the risk from occurring.209 James Gordley, on the
other hand, observes that while foreseeability is helpful to explain the
result in some contexts, it is not so helpful in others, such as war, where
neither party could have foreseen the intervening event.210 In those
situations, Gordley observes, the results seem related to the degree to
which a party could have controlled the event that made performance
impossible.211 Thus, control matters because the party in control could
have decreased the risk by taking reasonable precautions.212
The solution promoted under the Uniform Commercial Code213 and
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts214 is that performance may be
excused if it was premised upon a “basic assumption” that was false.
U.C.C. section 2-615 states:

204. Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 8, at 86.
205. Id. The doctrine of commercial impracticability is believed to have first appeared in
Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 156 P. 458 (Cal. 1916). See Sheldon W. Halpern, Application of
the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability: Searching for “the Wisdom of Solomon,” 135 U. PA.
L. REV. 1123, 1132 (1987).
206. Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 8, at 86. In his article, Kull similarly uses the word
“frustration” to encompass all the doctrines of frustration of purpose, impracticability, and
impossibility. See Kull, supra note 6, at 1 n.1.
207. Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 8, at 86. See also Gordley, supra note 6, at 524.
208. Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 8, at 86.
209. Id. at 90. See also Gordley, supra note 6, at 524.
But see Kull, supra note 6, at 47 (“Superior risk-bearing capacity as determined after the fact by
judges is therefore a default term that conveys no usable information to the parties; and an
uninformative default term cannot be the source of any economies from superior risk spreading.”).
210. Gordley, supra note 6, at 524.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. U.C.C. § 2-615 (1998).
214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981).
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Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation . . . (a)
Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller . . . is
not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as
agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency
the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the
contract was made . . . .”215

The doctrine of commercial impracticability, unlike the common law
doctrine of impossibility, expressly recognizes that fault should be
relevant to risk allocation and that in certain cases justice requires a
departure from the general rule that a promisor bears the risk of increased
difficulty of performance.216 The avoiding party must meet four
requirements. First, the avoiding party must show that the occurrence of
the event made “‘performance as agreed . . . impracticable.’”217 If the
agreement gives the party seeking avoidance a choice between
alternative ways of performing, the impracticability of performing one of
these alternatives does not excuse performance if another alternative
remains open.218 Second, the nonoccurrence of the condition must have
been a “‘basic assumption on which the contract was made.’”219 As
Gordley notes, “[t]o ask on what basic assumptions a contract was based
is not much different than asking . . . on what implied conditions it was
made.”220 Whether the nonoccurrence was in fact a basic contract
assumption is thus a question of foreseeability.221 Market fluctuations,
for example, are usually foreseeable.222 Third, the avoiding party must
not be at fault by, for example, acting negligently.223 Finally, the party
seeking avoidance must not have contractually assumed a greater
obligation than that imposed by law.224

215. Although section 2-615 expressly applies to commercial sellers, it has been interpreted by
some courts to include buyers as well. See, e.g., Lawrance v. Elmore Bean Warehouse, Inc., 702
P.2d 930, 932 (Idaho 1985) (stating that the provisions of U.C.C. section 2-615 are “applicable to
buyers as long as there is compliance with the statutory requirements”).
216. FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 9.6.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Gordley, supra note 6, at 525.
221. Lawrance v. Elmore Bean Warehouse, Inc., 702 P.2d 930, 932 (Idaho 1985).
222. The accompanying comment explains that “[i]ncreased cost alone does not excuse
performance unless the rise in cost is due to some unforeseen contingency which alters the essential
nature of the performance. Neither is a rise or a collapse in the market in itself a justification, for
that is exactly the type of business risk which business contracts made at fixed prices are intended to
cover.” U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 4 (1998).
223. FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 9.6.
224. Id.
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As several scholars have noted, the focus on “foreseeability” misses
the point and unnecessarily restricts the impracticability doctrine.225
Whether an event is foreseeable does not necessarily correlate with what
the parties intended, and silence does not necessarily mean that the party
seeking avoidance intended to assume the risk.226 I submit that all three
changed circumstances doctrines provide for excuse in the absence of
contextual purposive intent. For example, in Taylor v. Caldwell,
Caldwell entered into the agreement assuming the continued existence of
the music hall. He lacked cognitive intent because he failed to consider
the possibility of a fire, and he lacked contextual purposive intent to
enter into the contract as the circumstances turned out to be.
Contextual purposive intent requires judicial consideration of the
circumstances of the transaction both before and after the time of
contract formation. A consideration of “context” requires taking into
account trade norms unless a contrary subjective understanding can be
credibly proven. In Taylor v. Caldwell, the court decided in Caldwell’s
favor. If, however, the case were to arise today, given the prevalence
and customary nature of landowner’s insuring against fire damage, the
result might be different. Caldwell would likely have considered the
possibility of fire (thus, cognitive intent would exist). In addition, it has
become customary, at least in the United States, for landowners to carry
fire insurance on their properties. The existence of an industry norm
partially determines context. The courts have established such a norm in
contractor cases. Where a contractor has been hired to construct a
structure, the destruction of that structure by fire or otherwise will not
excuse the contractor’s performance. If, however, the contractor has
been hired to build an addition to an existing structure, destruction of that
existing structure will excuse the contractor’s performance. The
underlying rationale for distinguishing these two types of situations
hinges upon the fact that in the latter situation, the landowner is in a
better position than the contractor to insure against destruction of the
structure (whereas the contractor is in a better position to prevent damage
and insure against destruction of a new structure). The Uniform
225. John H. Stroh, The Failure of the Doctrine of Impracticability, 5 CORP. L. REV. 195, 216
(1982) (noting that the difficulty with foreseeability is that “it ignores the ‘how’ and ‘why’
businessmen contract”); George Wallach, The Excuse Defense in the Law of Contracts: Judicial
Frustration of the U.C.C. Attempt to Liberalize the Law of Commercial Impracticability, 55 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 203, 204–07 (1979).
226. Stephen J. Sirianni, The Developing Law of Contractual Impracticability and Impossibility:
Part I, 14 UCC L.J. 30, 65 (1981) (stating that to foresee a risk is not the same as allocating that
risk); Wallach, supra note 225 at 214–15 (noting that parties often are unable to agree on an
allocation even where a contingency is foreseeable).
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Commercial Code also considers insurance in the context of risk of loss,
although it does so rather coyly.227
IV. EXPECTED ARGUMENTS AGAINST PROPOSED DYNAMIC
APPROACH/EXPANDED INTENT ANALYSIS
A. Argument #1: Subjective Intent Is Impossible to Determine
Some may object that discerning subjective intent is extremely
difficult, if not impossible.228 This objection ignores that the issue of
subjective intent already exists in contract disputes, both in defenses229
and interpretation issues.230 In fact, focusing on subjective rather than
objective intent is more consistent with the underlying “will theory” of
contract law. Furthermore, it reflects the position adopted by the
Uniform Commercial Code.231 The “real world” issue will be one of
credibility. In most cases, the courts will assume that the parties
intended what reasonable contracting parties would have intended.232 If,
227. U.C.C. § 2-510 (1998) (putting risk of loss on the breaching party to the extent that the nonbreaching party’s insurance fails to cover the loss).
228. James Gordley notes that “nearly all modern jurists agree that an error in motive does not
warrant relief.” See Gordley, supra note 36, at 435.
229. See, e.g., Parev Prods. Co. v. I. Rokeach & Sons, 124 F.2d 147, 149 n.2 (2d Cir. 1941)
(declaring that the court reached the outcome the parties would have intended if they had “foreseen
the present contingency”).
230. Halpern, supra note 205, at 1127 (noting that the fictions used by the court in impossibility
cases are “essentially the same tools that are applied to other questions of contract interpretation and
enforcement”). Edward Imwinkelried suggests that “interpretative intention” or the “intention that a
person probably would have formed if he or she had foreseen the circumstances that came to pass,”
should be employed by judges in interpreting (outdated) legislation. Edward J. Imwinkelried, A
More Modest Proposal than a Common Law for the Age of Statutes: Greater Reliance in Statutory
Interpretation on the Concept of Interpretative Intention, 68 ALB. L. REV. 949, 953 (2005). But see
Rasmusen & Ayres, supra note 130, at 309 (“Reforming or voiding contracts . . . goes beyond the
gap-filling function in which courts customarily engage; it is an almost paternalistic change in the
contract’s express terms. Hence, contract law must be very careful how it treats ‘mistake.’”).
231. Many commentators view the Code’s adoption of the shared “basic assumption” test as a
departure from the fiction of objective intent to an analysis that takes into account subjective intent.
For instance, Halpern states that the Code’s shift would result in the concept of “foreseeability”
giving “way to a new behavioral analysis with the inquiry focused on what the parties actually
contemplated.” Halpern, supra note 205, at 1147. Yet, he argues that the Code’s “subjective search
for actual intent has not in fact displaced the centrality of objective foreseeability” by courts. Id. at
1148. Halpern, however, states that “if we dislike the concept of foreseeability, we might better ask
whether intent, subjectively or objectively determined, is an appropriate or even relevant
consideration in allocating the risks of seriously disruptive events and whether there are any
workable alternatives.” Id. at 1154. This Article, on the other hand, suggests that intent is highly
relevant; it must, however, be balanced against policy considerations.
232. See GROVER C. GRISMORE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 253 (John Edward
Murray, Jr., rev. ed. 1965) (“What we are really doing is imposing an obligation which the party
obligated, were he a reasonable man, probably would have been willing to assume, had the question
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however, there is credible evidence that demonstrates a contrary intent,
that finding of actual intent should trump the hypothetical, objective
intent. The evidentiary bar for the avoiding party is noteworthy given
the requirement of “good faith,” for the avoiding party must convince the
judge that she is telling the truth when she claims that although she acted
unreasonably, she acted honestly with respect to her intention in entering
into the agreement.
B. Argument #2: Courts Should Not Make Policy
Another concern likely to be raised is legislating from the bench.
This concern is most salient in connection with the consideration of
contextual purposive intent, which considers policy issues such as
economic efficiency and fairness. Yet, the basic assumption defenses
currently existing already consider policy.233 In fact, to the extent that a
legislative body has adopted the UCC, a refusal to incorporate these
policy objectives undermines legislative authority and is itself judicial
legislation.234 This Article does not promote any new policies in
connection with existing basic assumption defenses. What it does
advocate is the separation of the two central concerns addressed by
existing basic assumption defenses. In each defense, there is an intent
inquiry regarding the parties’ contractual purpose.235 Currently, mistake
defenses limit that inquiry to the facts at the time of contract formation,
while changed circumstances doctrines consider facts arising after
contract formation.236
More importantly, however, formalistic
constraints subvert the underlying purpose of contract law. We infer
intent from actions, and context gives meaning to actions. To require
performance where circumstances have undermined contextual purposive
intent is to ignore the very reason why we enforce contracts.237 To
illustrate this on a very basic level, imagine that a parent makes a
promise to her child that they will go swimming later in the day. The
child falls asleep in the car and does not awaken until several hours later
presented itself when the contract was made.”).
233. See Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 747, 757 (discussing fairness and efficiency as the basis for
the bargain theory and principles of unconscionability).
234. George Wallach has argued that courts have adhered to the common law standards for
excuse and have ignored the UCC drafters’ intent to liberalize those standards, making the
successful use of commercial impracticability as a defense difficult, if not impossible. See Wallach,
supra note 225, at 203, 218.
235. See supra Part III.
236. Id.
237. See Eisenberg, supra note 51, at 1624 (stating that “a literalist approach undermines the
purpose of contract law”).
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when it is dinnertime. A very young or very manipulative child will
insist that the parent adhere to her promise. A more mature or less
manipulative child will understand that the circumstances warrant a
change in plans, and that there will be no swimming that day. That child
may feel disappointed, but he will understand the reason that the promise
must be broken. The moral obligation to keep a promise does not always
override every other obligation, moral or otherwise, and not every broken
promise is immoral.238 Like the mature child, a more developed legal
system would recognize that, sometimes, context changes the meaning of
words.
C. Argument #3: A Dynamic Approach Is Unfair
Some may ask, what about the other party, the non-avoiding party?
Should his interests not be protected? The answer is that the other
party’s interests are considered at each step of the proposed intent
analysis. Volitional intent takes into account socially unacceptable
behavior on the part of the other party, such as the making of threats or
the use of intimidation, which does not so much protect the non-avoiding
party’s interest as discern whether it is worth protecting at all. Cognitive
intent analysis requires asking whether the parties discussed or
considered the facts giving rise to the request for avoidance. Contextual
purposive intent considers trade norms and fairness issues, such as the
existence or availability of insurance.239 Finally, even where one or more
facets of intent may be lacking, the contract may yet be enforced if the
societal interest in the security of transactions is great enough, such as
where both parties have fully performed, where there is reliance,240 or
where the market is inherently speculative.241
238. Mel Eisenberg discusses this point with respect to mistakes: “Some types of mistake
provide a moral justification for not keeping a promise. Correspondingly, a promisee may act badly
if she insists on full performance even after she has been made aware of such a mistake.” Eisenberg,
supra note 51, at 1579. He further states that in some cases, two moral norms may conflict:
[f]or example, the moral norm “don’t lie” is not inconsistent with the moral norm
“venerate human life,” even though under certain circumstances venerating human life
might require lying—as in lying to an assassin about his victim’s whereabouts. It does
not lessen our commitment to truth-telling that we believe it is sometimes morally
permissible not to tell the truth.
Id. at 1581.
239. See Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1978) (noting that insurance is often the only effective means of risk reduction);
Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 8, at 91.
240. The reliance would also have to be in good faith.
241. For example, because of the difficulty, even impossibility, of establishing authenticity or
establishing pricing for art, invalidating contracts where there was a failure of cognitive intent may
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An expanded intent analysis streamlines the current regime of
contract defenses, which is generally agreed to be inexact at best, and
incoherent at worst. It erases the artificial distinctions inherent in the
doctrinal categories (such as the timing of the discovery of the excusing
condition) to focus on what courts tend to focus on anyway—contractual
intent. It is flexible enough to accommodate evolving business and
social norms. In particular, the Internet has provided a useful new
medium by which to conduct transactions while its very widespread
availability and accessibility create more opportunities for basic
assumption errors.
Let us return to the hypothetical Internet homebuyer presented at the
beginning of this Article. Our homebuyer purchased her home after
viewing several attractive pictures that accurately reflected the home’s
condition. They did not, however, reveal something of great importance
to the homebuyer. She lacked the cognitive intent to enter into the
transaction because she did not know about the noise from the nearby
road. Her contextual purposive intent in entering into the transaction was
to purchase a home that provided peace and tranquility. Under my
proposed intent analysis, she should therefore be permitted to avoid the
agreement provided that it is not offset by the societal interest in the
security of transaction. If, for example, she had not discovered the noisy
road until she had moved into the house, she should not be allowed to
avoid the agreement. This expanded intent analysis thus reflects
something more than legal obligations—it reflects the way people
actually conduct business. 242 Merchants are not required to refund
conforming purchases to unhappy customers,243 but many do anyway and
claim “satisfaction or your money back, no questions asked.” Permitting
avoidance would also encourage fuller disclosure by Internet sellers.
Existing law generally does not impose a duty to disclose; yet imposing
upon the purchaser the same standards of investigation as those existing
prior to the advent of the Internet diminishes many of the advantages of
conducting business online, such as reduced travel expenses. Allowing
the purchaser to avoid a contract where there is a lack of cognitive intent
would prompt Internet sellers to provide a more accurate description of
their wares. If we accept that the Internet confers a benefit on the
cause “a chain of contracts [to] fall like dominos as far back as the available evidence will go.” See
Gordley, supra note 36, at 455.
242. This hypothetical is based on an actual situation where the buyer was able to get out of the
purchase. See Tim Neville, Buying a Second Home Without a First Look, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2005,
at F6. See also Elizabeth Rhodes, Buyer’s New Buddy, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006, at G1.
243. The U.C.C. requires merchants to provide a remedy for nonconforming merchandise unless
expressly and conspicuously disclaimed. See U.C.C. §§ 2-313 to -316 (1998).
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economy and society—because it promotes the contract law objective of
economic efficiency by providing an accessible marketplace where more
private parties can allocate resources to a higher valued use244—we
should also acknowledge and accommodate the paradigmatic shift it has
created in the way contracts are formed.
V. CONCLUSION
Contract law has historically acknowledged the importance of the
intent of the parties in contract interpretation and enforcement. Yet, the
meaning of “intent” has been left unexamined. Basic assumption
defenses exemplify the dynamic nature of neoclassical contract law.
Dynamic contract law first effectuates the objectives of the contracting
parties and then considers any policy constraints on those objectives.245
In order for contract law to be truly dynamic, however, both parts of the
analysis must be dynamic and contextualized. An evaluation of policy
considerations is, by its nature, dynamic and contextualized as it takes
into account societal needs at the time and place of dispute resolution.
Traditionally, consideration of contractual intent, although somewhat
contextual, is seldom dynamic. Classical contract law’s vision of intent
is static (as opposed to dynamic) because it only considers intent as it
exists at the time of contract formation. A failure to examine contractual
intent in light of events subsequent to contract formation often
undermines the purpose of the contract.246
Furthermore, contract law’s treatment of intent is only partly
contextual because of the continuing influence of the “objective”
standard of reasonableness. While classical contract law theoretically
enforced contracts because the individual had assumed contractual
liability,247 it did so by viewing the individual’s actions from the
standpoint of a reasonable person248 rather than by considering the
244. Online real estate companies, for example, provide sellers with alternatives other than
having to pay the standard real estate agent commission of 6%. Rhodes, supra note 242. Auction
sites, such as eBay, exemplify the execution of value optimization by private parties.
245. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 23.
246. See supra Part III.
247. See, e.g., Feinman, supra note 23, at 1286.
248. See Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 1749 (discussing the rigidity of classical contract law).
DiMatteo has traced the roots of the “reasonable person” to a “‘Greek philosophical tradition grafted
on to Roman law by moral philosophers.’” DiMatteo, supra note 32, at 305. He further notes that
the objectivity of contracts was historically measured by religious morality:
In the Middle Ages the convergence of canon and secular law was embodied in the
rediscovery of Justinian’s Codex, Novellae, Institutiones, and Digestae. This was the
genesis of the idea of the existence of an autonomous device to judge private exchanges
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individual’s subjective intent.249 Classical contract law’s adoption of the
objective theory of interpretation considered the actual, unexpressed
intent of the parties as irrelevant.250 Instead, the courts considered the
overt acts of the parties rather than their subjective beliefs or
motivations.251
The modern approach, adopted by the Second
Restatement, reflects a mix of both objective and subjective elements.252
Under that view, language is interpreted in accordance with its generally

and relationships . . . . The reasonable person can be seen as an external, autonomous
source, much in the order of this tradition . . . . The equating of breach of promise to
dishonesty in business “combined to give to contracts a measure of religious blessedness
and to breaches of contract a mark of sinful or unethical aberration.” The morality of
promise was the autonomous measure to which the contract breaker was to be held . . . .
The genesis of the reasonable person can be seen in law’s religious ancestors . . . . One
can see the reasonable person as the embodiment of Aquinas’ notion of human reason.
Id. at 306–07 (citing SIR DAVID HUGHES PARRY, THE SANCTITY OF CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH LAW 6
(1959)).
249. Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 1756–58. This seeming inconsistency is reflected in classical
contract law’s formalistic static and binary nature. Id. at 1749. Larry A. DiMatteo notes that
[a]t first, the will theorists viewed the reasonable person standard as merely providing
evidence of the subjective understanding of the parties . . . . In the process of formalizing
and generalizing the system of contract law, the legal rules came to bear a more and more
tenuous relationship to the actual intent of the parties. What once could be defended and
justified as simply a more efficacious way of carrying out the parties’ intentions came
eventually to be perceived as a system that subordinated and overruled the parties’ will.
DiMatteo, supra note 32, at 297.
250. See FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 383–84 (“Classical contract law adopted a
theory of interpretation that was purely, or almost purely, objective.”).
251. Id. The court in Woburn National Bank v. Woods, espoused the objective theory of contract
when it stated:
A contract involves what is called a meeting of the minds of the parties. But this does not
mean that they must have arrived at a common mental state touching the manner in hand.
The standard by which their conduct is judged and their rights are limited is not internal
but external. In the absence of fraud or incapacity, the question is: What did the party say
and do? “The making of a contract does not depend upon the state of the parties’ minds;
it depends upon their overt acts.”
89 A. 491, 492 (N.H. 1914).
252. The Restatement provides as follows:
(1) Where the parties have attached the same meaning to a promise or agreement or a
term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning.
(2) Where the parties have attached different meanings to a promise or agreement or a
term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with the meaning attached by one of them if
at the time the agreement was made
(a) that party did not know of any different meaning attached by the other, and the
other knew the meaning attached by the first party; or
(b) that party had no reason to know of any different meaning attached by the other,
and the other had reason to know the meaning attached by the first party.
(3) Except as stated in this Section, neither party is bound by the meaning attached by the
other, even though the result may be a failure of mutual assent.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 (1981).
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prevailing meaning unless a different intention is shown.253 Thus,
classical contract law’s influence remains today. The objective theory of
contracts replaces the underlying purposes of contract law—
promulgating the intent of the parties—with a normative function; the
reasonable person is himself a norm.
The primary objective of contract law is not, however, to standardize
contracting behavior.
Perhaps the single most acknowledged
justification for contract enforcement is that contracting promotes
individual autonomy or the “will of the parties.”254 Yet, the parties to a
contract are not always “reasonable,” or at least not reasonable as such a
term may be understood by a decisionmaker with a different background
and experiences.255 People, even where they are reasonable, are not
always reasonable in the same way. Parties often do not always share the
same assumptions, experience, cultural or social values, bargaining
power or access to information, either with each other or with the
decisionmaker or hypothetical reasonable person. Thus, even if we were
to accept dynamic contract law’s view of contractual intent as purely
subjective, we must still resolve the issue of how we should analyze such
intent.
In this paper, I have proposed one possibility for evaluating intent
and applied this expanded intent framework in the context of basic
assumption defenses.
A dynamic approach to mistaken basic
253. Id. The Second Restatement expressly acknowledges that
there are substantial differences between English and American usages and between
usages in different parts of the United States. Differences of usages also exist in various
localities and in different social, economic, religious and ethnic groups. All these usages
change over time, and persons engaged in transactions with each other often develop
temporary usages peculiar to themselves. Moreover, most words are commonly used in
more than one sense.
Id. § 201 cmt. a.
254. Friedrich Kessler, Introduction: Contract as a Principle of Order, in FRIEDRICH KESSLER
ET AL., CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1986), reprinted in A CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY 32, 34 (Peter Linzer ed.,
2d ed. 1995); ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 149 (1954). See
generally, FRIED, supra note 19.
255. See Blake Morant, Law, Literature, and Contract: An Essay in Realism, 4 MICH. J. RACE &
L. 1, 7–8. As Blake Morant notes, “[I]n many controversies involving principles of contract, factors
of race, ethnicity or gender can play a tangential, if not pivotal, role in the formation and
adjudication of many binding obligations.” Id. He further notes,
[t]he contextual circumstances presented by notable contract decisions [such as Williams
v. Walker Thomas Furniture Co. and Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.] compel a
readjustment of contract pedagogy and demand a more probative analysis of bargaining
relationships. Thus, factors of racial or gender bias command attention, particularly
when they can impact the formation or judicial interpretation of agreements.
Id.
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assumption-type situations (which would replace existing defenses)
would apply expanded intent analysis first, and then consider whether the
societal interest in the security of transactions compels enforcement
notwithstanding the absence of one or more facets of intent. By
eliminating the doctrinal categories, a dynamic approach streamlines
analysis of cases where what the parties bargained for is very different
from what they received. Dynamic contract law strives to effectuate the
underlying objectives of contract law, rather than merely adhering to the
rules that implement those objectives. Finally, a dynamic approach is
adaptive and accommodates changes in contracting culture brought about
by technological advancements and globalization.256

256. See generally Kim, supra note 23.

